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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(b)(j) and 
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court's May 11, 
2010 Order transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. ®. at 536). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: The issue is whether the District Court erred by granting Uintah County's 
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Standard of Review: "A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based upon 
the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint presents a question of law that [this Court] 
review[s] for correctness." Osguthorpe v. WolfMt. Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, ^ 10, 232 
P.3d 999 (internal quotations omitted). Further, when reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, this Court must "accept the plaintiffs description of facts alleged in the 
complaint to be true, but [it] need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor need [it] 
accept legal conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts." Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). In addition, "it is well established that an appellate court may affirm the 
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even if it differs from that stated by the trial court." Id. (internal quotations 
omitted). 
Preservation: Plaintiffs identify their Memorandum in Opposition to Uintah 
County's Motion to Dismiss in support of their claim that this issue is preserved. 
1 
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However, contrary to Plaintiffs' briefing, their Memorandum in Opposition is not 
attached to their brief or in their Addendum. For the convenience of the Court, Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition may be found at pages 223 to 244 in the record. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of the death of Detective Kevin Orr of the Uintah County 
Sheriffs Office. Detective Orr was killed in a helicopter crash while on a search and 
rescue mission. The helicopter was owned by Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., and/or Rat Air, 
Inc. The pilot, a Pete Martin Drilling, Inc. employee, was Brian Grayson. 
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, Utah on November 4, 2008 (Case no. 0809233329) {"Orr IF). ®. 
at 4). On October 5, 2009, the Third Judicial District Court transferred this action to the 
Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah County, and the matter received a new case 
number (090800834). ®. at 185-86). Plaintiffs9 Complaint essentially seeks a 
declaratory judgment defining which Defendants may be liable for the helicopter crash, 
namely Uintah County or Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Brian Grayson. The 
gravamen of Plaintiffs' Complaint asks whether Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. 
and Brian Grayson (collectively, the "Helicopter Defendants") were acting as volunteers 
for Uintah County at the time of the accident and are therefore covered by the Volunteer 
Government Worker's Act (Utah Code section 67-20-1 et seq.) and the Immunity for 
Persons Performing Voluntary Service Act (Utah Code section 63G-8-101 et seq.). 
2 
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However, the Helicopter Defendants are not named in Plaintiffs' Complaint. ®. at 10)} 
The first cause of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment 
stating that the Helicopter Defendants are not covered by the Volunteer Government 
Worker's Act and not immune under the Immunity for Persons Performing Voluntary 
Service Act. ®. at 6-7). Plaintiffs' second cause of action is identified as "Immunity for 
Persons Performing Voluntary Service Acf and alleges that the Helicopter Defendants 
are not volunteers under that statute. The second cause of action then states "[h]owever, 
in the event that a court of competent jurisdiction determines that [the Helicopter 
Defendants] are volunteers and that Grayson was merely negligent, Plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover their damages[.]" ®. at 5-6). Plaintiffs' third cause of action is entitled 
"Volunteer Government Workers Acf" and states "[i]n the event that a court of competent 
jurisdiction finds [the Helicopter Defendants] to be volunteers under the Volunteer 
Government Workers Act..., Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages as set forth 
below from Uintah County under a statutory policy of defense and indemnity." ®. at 5). 
At the time Plaintiffs filed this action {Orr II) there was already an action pending 
in the Eighth Judicial District Court filed by Plaintiffs against persons and entities 
allegedly responsible for Detective Orr's death, including the Helicopter Defendants 
{"Orr F).2 Uintah County is not named as a Defendant in Orr /, but it moved to intervene 
1
 Plaintiffs' Complaint is Exhibit F to the Addendum to Brief of Appellants. 
2
 That Eighth Judicial District case is captioned Claudia Orr and Eugene Orr et. 
al. v. Brian Grayson, et al (Case No. 070800045). 
3 
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in that case and substitute itself for the Helicopter Defendants. (R. at 220-21). Uintah 
County's Motion to Intervene averred that the Helicopter Defendants were volunteers at 
the time of Detective Orr's death, which qualified them as County employees entitled to 
governmental immunity. (R. at 217). Plaintiffs opposed that Motion. In addition, 
Plaintiffs asked for and received from the Court a continuance in order to conduct 
discovery as to the volunteer status of the Helicopter Defendants. (R. at 217). Upon 
completion of that discovery, Uintah County renewed its Motion to Intervene. 
Meanwhile, Plaintiffs commenced the instant action, Orr II, in anticipation of the Court's 
ruling on the Motion to Intervene in Orr I. (R. at 217). 
On April 8, 2009, the Court issued its Ruling and Order in Orr I and found that the 
Helicopter Defendants were not volunteers so as to qualify as Uintah County employees. 
That Court also found that Uintah County was not entitled to intervene and be substituted 
in the place of the Helicopter Defendants. {R. at 200-09). In other words, the Court in 
Orr I has already decided the very issues Plaintiffs attempted to re-litigate in Orr II. 
In light of this procedural history, Uintah County filed a Motion to Dismiss in the 
instant case, Orr II, arguing that Plaintiffs' Complaint was an attempt to relitigate the 
issues of Orr I. Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss cited several legal doctrines in 
support of dismissal, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial comity, the law 
4 
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of the case doctrine, and the first filed rule. (R. at 194-222)? Plaintiffs failed to 
challenge, or even address, these legal doctrines in their Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 223-44).4 Uintah County pointed this concession out to the 
District Court in its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 248-
54).5 
On April 21, 2010, the District Court granted the Motion to Dismiss and issued a 
Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Ruling and Order "). ®. at 517-
520).6 In short, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiffs' first and 
second causes of action should have been brought against the Helicopter Defendants in 
Orr /, and because the Helicopter Defendants are not parties to this case. [Adden. Exhibit 
A R. at 519). The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' third cause of action because 
Plaintiffs failed to allege that Uintah County was negligent. (Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 
519). The Court further ruled that "the Plaintiffs' reason for initiating this action is to 
create a fall back in the event that they are unsuccessful in Orr I. If the Plaintiffs wanted 
3
 Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support is attached 
hereto as Exhibit A of the Appellee's Addendum. 
4
 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B of the Appellee's Addendum. 
5
 Uintah County's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss [and] 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Change Venue is attached hereto as Exhibit C 
of the Appellee ys Addendum. 
6
 The District Court's Ruling and Order is attached hereto as Exhibit D of the 
Appellee's Addendum. 
5 
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to bring a claim that arose from the same facts and circumstances as those in Orr I, they 
should have stated that claim in their case." (Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 519). Finally, the 
Court stated that Plaintiffs' "claim is uncertain and fails to specify the cause of action. 
The claim is contingent on the outcome of Orr /." (Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 518-19). 
Plaintiffs now appeal from the District Court's Ruling and Order. ®. at 523-31). 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' SUGGESTION OF PARTIAL MOOTNESS 
Plaintiffs' brief contains a section entitled "Suggestion of Partial Mootness," 
which states that Plaintiffs have settled with Pete Martin Drilling and Brian Grayson. 
(App. Br. at 1). Plaintiffs also state that the District Court's ruling in Orr I on Uintah 
County's Motion to Intervene is a final order and that all issues in Orr I that relate to 
Uintah County have been resolved. (App. Br. at 1-2). Plaintiffs fail to explain why these 
events render their appeal partially moot. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs settlement with Pete 
Martin Drilling and Brian Grayson is irrelevant to this appeal as those parties are not 
named in this case. Further, the District Court's ruling in Orr I does not render this 
appeal moot. Rather, as discussed below, the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint should be affirmed because that Complaint attempted to relitigate the issues 
previously decided in Orr I. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the District Court's 12(b)(6) dismissal on the merits 
because even when the allegation in Plaintiffs' Complaint are construed in Plaintiffs' 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
favor, those allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Any 
claims that Plaintiffs had against the Helicopter Defendants should have been raised in 
Orr I and not in this matter. The District Court also properly dismissed Plaintiffs' third 
cause of action because Plaintiffs have not alleged any negligence on the part of Uintah 
County. Further, Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claims seek relief that will affect the 
interests of the Helicopter Defendants, yet those parties are not named in this case. 
Additionally, this Court should affirm the District Court's Ruling and Order 
because Plaintiffs have inadequately briefed their appeal. Plaintiffs' brief is conclusory at 
best and contains no explanation or analysis of their position. Plaintiffs also failed to cite 
to the record, failed to provide a transcript of the hearing on Uintah County's Motion to 
Dismiss, and have not included the District Court's Ruling and Order in their Appendix. 
This Court should also affirm the District Court based on any theory or ground that 
it finds in the record. Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss provided several reasons for 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, but the District Court focused on rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This Court has discretion to apply Uintah County's 
alternative arguments and affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS' 
COMPLAINT UNDER RULE 12(b)(6) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Plaintiffs assert that the District Court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of their case was 
improper because Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged all of the statutory elements in the 
Immunity for Persons Performing Voluntary Service Act (Utah Code section 63G-8-202) 
against Uintah County, and because those allegations must be deemed to be true for 
purposes of analyzing a Motion to Dismiss. (App. Br. at 8).1 As will be discussed below, 
the District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' claims because they failed to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
A. The Motion to Dismiss Standard. 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a challenge to a 
plaintiffs relief based on his or her "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted." Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[T]he purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is to 
challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or 
resolve the merits of a case.. . . [And] a dismissal is justified only when the allegations 
of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim." Whipple v. 
7
 Plaintiffs' appeal apparently concerns only the District Court's dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' claims under the Immunity for Persons Performing Voluntary Service Act 
(Utah Code section 63G-8-101 et seq.) and not the Volunteer Government Worker's Act 
(Utah Code section 67-20-1 et seq.). Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal, however, wholly 
appeals from the District Court's Ruling and Order. (R. at 523-31). As will be discussed 
in this brief, all aspects of the District Court's Ruling and Order should be affirmed. 
8 
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Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). "In reviewing a motion to 
dismiss, [Courts] accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs." Hebertson 
v. WillowcreekPlaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1390 (Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
When reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court must "accept the plaintiffs 
description of facts alleged in the complaint to be true, but [it] need not accept extrinsic 
facts not pleaded nor need [it] accept legal conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded 
facts." Osguthorpe v. Wolf ML Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, U 10, 232 P.3d 999 (emphasis 
added) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the District Court had to determine whether 
Plaintiffs' Complaint set forth factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level. Plaintiffs failed to meet this burden and the District Court's 
12(b)(6) dismissal was proper. 
B. The District Court Properly Applied Rule 12(b)(6) and this Court 
Should Affirm the Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
(1) The District Court Construed the Allegations in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint as True. 
The District Court's April 21, 2010 Ruling and Order correctly interpreted the 
facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint and determined that Plaintiffs did not have a claim 
against Uintah County. Indeed, the District Court noted that "[t]he Rule 12(b)(6) defense 
is a challenge to the plaintiffs right to relief based on the facts the plaintiff has alleged 
in the complaint." (Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 519 (emphasis added)). In other words, the 
9 
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District Court accepted the factual allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint as true and drew 
all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 
Hebertson, 923 P.2d at 1390. Thus, the District Court correctly applied the standard for a 
motion to dismiss and properly construed Plaintiffs' Complaint in its Ruling and Order. 
(2) The District Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiffs5 First and Second 
Causes of Action. 
The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action because it 
determined that those claims should have been brought against the Helicopter Defendants 
in Orr I, and because the Helicopter Defendants were not parties to this case. (Adden. 
Exhibit D, R. at 519). A review of Plaintiffs' Complaint demonstrates the correctness of 
the District Court's dismissal. 
The first cause of action in Plaintiffs' Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment 
stating that the Helicopter Defendants are not covered by the Volunteer Government 
Worker's Act and not immune under the Immunity for Persons Performing Voluntary 
Service Act. ®. at 6-7). Plaintiffs' second cause of action alleges that the Helicopter 
Defendants are not volunteers under the Immunity for Persons Performing Voluntary 
Service Act and then states "[hjowever, in the event that a court of competent jurisdiction 
determines that [the Helicopter Defendants] are volunteers and that Grayson was merely 
negligent, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages[.]" ®. at 5-6). 
The District Court construed Plaintiffs' second cause of action as a claim for 
declaratory relief. The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' first and second cause of 
10 
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action stating "[The Helicopter Defendants] are not parties to this matter. Furthermore, 
[The Helicopter Defendants] are defendants in Orr I, which concerns the same facts as 
this case. Any claims or defenses against these defendants should have been raised in Orr 
L Therefore, the Court cannot grant the Plaintiffs [sic] requested relief as to those two 
claims." (Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 519). The District Court had ample authority for such a 
ruling. Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss cited several legal doctrines in support of 
dismissal, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial comity, the law of the case 
doctrine, and the first filed rule. (Adden. Exhibit A, R. at 194-222). Plaintiffs failed to 
challenge, or even address, these legal doctrines in their Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, {Adden. Exhibit B, R. at 223-44), and Uintah County made this point 
to the District Court, (Adden. Exhibit C, R. at 248-54). This failure alone was sufficient 
to grant the Motion to Dismiss because Plaintiffs conceded Uintah County's arguments. 
See U.S. v. Garcia, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1253 (D. Kan. 1999) (construing party's failure 
to address issue as a concession of that issue); Super Film of America v. UCB Films, 219 
F.R.D. 649, 660 (D. Kan. 2004) (determining that moving party's failure to address non-
moving party's argument in reply memorandum was sufficient grounds to rule against 
moving party); Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, Kansas, 19 Fed. Appx. 749, 768, 2001 WL 
980781 (10th Cir. 2001). 
Moreover, the District Court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' first and second cause of 
action because the Helicopter Defendants were not parties to this case is supported by the 
11 
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provisions of the Utah declaratory judgment statute, which states "[w]hen declaratory 
relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which 
would be affected by the declaration, and a declaration may not prejudice the rights of 
persons not parties to the proceeding." Utah Code § 78B-6-403. Here, the Helicopter 
Defendants were not joined as parties to this case, despite the fact that their interests 
would be affected by any declaratory judgment on their status under the Volunteer 
Government Worker's Act and the Immunity for Persons Performing Voluntary Service 
Act. The District Court therefore properly dismissed Plaintiffs' first and second causes of 
action and this Court should affirm that dismissal. 
(3) The District Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiffs5 Third Cause of 
Action. 
Plaintiffs' third cause of action states "[i]n the event that a court of competent 
jurisdiction finds [the Helicopter Defendants] to be volunteers under the Volunteer 
Government Workers Act..., Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages as set forth 
below from Uintah County under a statutory policy of defense and indemnity." ®. at 5). 
The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' third cause of action because Plaintiffs failed to 
allege that Uintah County was negligent. {Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 519). This dismissal 
was proper because Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege any facts that support their 
negligence claim against Uintah County. When reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this 
Court must "accept the plaintiffs description of facts alleged in the complaint to be true, 
but [it] need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor need [it] accept legal 
12 
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conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts." Osguthorpe v. Wolf Ml Resorts, 
L.C., 2010 UT 29, % 10, 232 P.3d 999 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
When read as a whole, Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Uintah County was not negligent 
because the Helicopter Defendants were not protected by the Volunteer Government 
Workers Act. Plaintiffs then allege that if the Volunteer Government Workers Act does 
apply, Uintah County should be liable. Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege how Uintah 
County acted negligently so the District Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' third cause 
of action and excluded the "extrinsic facts not pleaded" against Uintah County. Id. 
(4) The District Court Correctly Recognized Orr II as an Attempt to 
Relitigate Orr I. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint in Orr II was filed against Uintah County as an end run 
around the proceedings in Orr I. The District Court recognized this strategy and ruled 
that "the Plaintiffs' reason for initiating this action is to create a fall back in the event that 
they are unsuccessful in Orr I. If the Plaintiffs wanted to bring a claim that arose from the 
same facts and circumstances as those in Orr I, they should have stated that claim in their 
case." (Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 519). Finally, the Court stated that Plaintiffs' "claim is 
uncertain and fails to specify the cause of action. The claim is contingent on the outcome 
of Orr I." {Adden. Exhibit D, R. at 518-19). This ruling should be upheld as 
demonstrated by the procedural history of Orr I and Orr II, as well as the legal doctrines 
cited in Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss, including including res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, judicial comity, the law of the case doctrine, and the first filed rule. (Adden. 
13 
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Exhibit A & at 194-222). 
©) Plaintiffs have Inadequately Briefed their Challenge of the District Court's 
Ruling and Order. 
Although Plaintiffs baldly claim that their Complaint sufficiently alleged claims to 
survive Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs fail to analyze and explain how or 
why the District Court erred. Specifically, Plaintiffs have not explained their allegation 
that the District Court failed to construe the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint as true. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs have not identified (or cited in the record) the specific allegations in 
their Complaint that demonstrate that the District Court erred by granting Uintah 
County's Motion to Dismiss. 
In total, Plaintiffs submitted three (3) pages or argument in support of their appeal. 
{App. Br. at 7-9). This conclusory approach contains little to no explanation or analysis 
of the proceedings below or the legal standards applicable to this appeal. Such a tersely 
briefed argument constitutes inadequate briefing because "a brief is inadequate if it 
merely contains bald citations to authority [without] development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ^  9, 194 P.3d 903 
(internal quotations omitted). In short, Plaintiffs' brief does not contain sufficient 
analysis, including citation to case law and the record, to demonstrate that the District 
Court should be reversed. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs' opening brief also fails to cite to the record and does not 
contain the District Court's Ruling and Order, the decision from which their appeal is 
14 
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taken. This also constitutes inadequate briefing because "not only must [Plaintiffs] point 
out the perceived errors of the lower court, [they] must also provide the appellate court 
with the parts of the record that are central to the determination of [their] appeal." Allen, 
2008 UT 56, % 10; see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1)©) (noting that an addendum to the 
appellant's brief shall contain "those parts of the record on appeal that are of central 
importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the . . . memorandum decision"). 
Further, "[i]f a party fails to provide a statement of the facts along with a citation to the 
record where those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of the judgment." 
Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm% 845 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Plaintiffs also failed to request a transcript of the hearing on Uintah County's 
Motion to Dismiss as required by rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This 
is problematic because the District Court's Ruling and Order expressly referenced 
arguments made during the hearing. ®. at 520). "If an appellant fails to provide an 
adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings 
below." State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Wullfenstein, 
657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not marshal or explain the 
District Court's Ruling and Order, instead leaving Uintah County to provide the proper 
context of that ruling. Consequently, this Court should affirm the District Court based on 
Plaintiffs' inadequate briefing on appeal. 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT ON ANY 
GROUND APPARENT IN THE RECORD. 
In addition to the foregoing arguments on the merits, this Court should affirm the 
District Court's dismissal based on the appellate record. "[A]n appellate court may affirm 
the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on 
the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the [district] 
court to be the basis of its ruling [and] even though such ground or theory is not urged or 
argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered 
or passed on by the lower court." State v. Robinson, 2006 UT 65, ^  19, 147 P.3d 448 
(second and third alterations in original). Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss cited 
several legal doctrines in support of dismissal, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
judicial comity, the law of the case doctrine, and the first filed rule. {Adden. Exhibit A, R. 
at 194-222 ). Although the District Court did not expressly apply any of these legal 
theories in its Ruling and Order, all of these theories warrant dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. This Court has the discretion to apply the doctrines of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, judicial comity, law of the case, and the first filed rule to affirm the District 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Uintah County respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the District Court's April 21, 2010 Ruling and Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
which granted the County's Motion to Dismiss. 
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DATED this _[H_ day of January, 2011. 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Noah M. Hoagland 
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
John H. Gothard, Jr. 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Uintah County, Utah 
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EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAUDIA ORR and EUGENE ORR, 
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son, KEVIN ORR, HOLLY ORR, 
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000222 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This case arises out of the death of Detective Kevin Orr of the Uintah County 
Sheriffs Office. Detective Orr was killed in a helicopter crash while on a search and 
rescue mission. The helicopter was owned by Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., and or Rat Air, 
Inc. The pilot, a Pete Martin Drilling, Inc. employee, was Brian Grayson. 
This is essentially a declaratory judgment action in which Plaintiffs are asking the 
Court to determine whether Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and/or Grayson were 
"volunteers" so as to be entitled to the immunity provided volunteers under the Utah 
Volunteer Services Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-8-101, etseq. or the Volunteer 
Government Worker's Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-20-1, etseq*} Plaintiffs are also asking 
that in the event the Court determines that Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and/or 
Grayson are volunteers so as to be Uintah County employees, then to award Plaintiffs 
damages from Uintah County. 
What Plaintiffs neglect to advise this Court, however, is that there is presently 
pending in the Uintah County District Court a lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs against persons 
and entities allegedly responsible for Detective Orr's death, including Pete Martin 
Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Grayson ("Orr F). But Uintah County, Utah is not named 
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as a Defendant in Orr I} In Orr i, however, asserting the volunteer status of Pete Martin 
Drealing,Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Grayson Uintah County moved to intervene and to 
substitute itself as the Defendant in place of Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and 
Grayson. In addition, in Orr /these same defendants raised their volunteer status as a 
defense under both the Utah Volunteer Services Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-8-101, et 
seq. and the Volunteer Government Worker's Act, Utah Code Ann, §§ 67-20-1, et seq. 
On April 8,2009, the Honorable John R. Anderson issued his Ruling and Order on 
Uintah County's Motion to intervene and substitute. In that Ruling and Order, Judge 
Anderson concluded that Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Brian Grayson were 
not volunteers under either the Utah Volunteer Services Act or Volunteer Government ^ 
Worker *s Act so as to be entitled to the immunity normally enjoyed by County employees 
and Uintah County could not be substitute as a proper party Defendant. Judge Anderson 
also concluded that Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Grayson were not 
common law servants so as to be otherwise entitled to immunity enjoyed by County 
employees.2 
1
 That Eighth Judicial District case is captioned Claudia Orr and Eugene Orr et al v. 
Brian Grayson, et al, and it is Case No. 070800045. 
2A copy of Judge Anderson's Ruling and Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. That 
decision was entered after extensive discovery by Plaintiffs as to the volunteer status of 
3 
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Plaintiffs commenced the instant action in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, Utah on November 4, 2008 ("Orr IF). The Third Judicial District 
court transferred this action to the Uintah County District Court. With this latest lawsuit, 
Plaintiffs are asking the Court to revisit Judge Anderson's decision. 
WHEREFORE, Uintah County, Utah hereby moves to dismiss Plaintiffs5 
Complaint. The relief which Uintah County seeks with this Motion this Court is 
authorized to grant pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), 12(c), as 
well as the doctrines ofres judicata, collateral estoppel, comity and the First Filed Rule. 
Uintah County's Memorandum in support is set forth below. Oral argument is 
requested. 
FACTS 
The facts necessary for the Court to rule upon this Motion are as follows: 
1. Detective Orr was killed on November 21,2006, during a search and rescue 
operation being conducted by the Uintah County Sheriffs Office. Detective Orr's death 
occurred in Uintah County, Utah. 
Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Grayson and after a full and fair hearing. The 
Court can and should take judicial notice of these matters in the related case before Judge 
Anderson. See Schweitzer v, Scotts, 469 F.Supp. 1017, 1020 (CD. Cal. 1979)(a Court 
can take judicial notice of its own files in related cases). 
4 
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2. At the time of his death, Detective Orr was a passenger in a helicopter 
owned by Pete Martin Drilling, Inc. and operated by Pete Martin's employee Brian 
Grayson. That helicopter had on it the logo of Rat Air, Inc. and was in the process of 
being transferred to Rat Air when the accident that took Detective Orr's life occurred. 
3* Pilot Grayson was flying the helicopter and Detective Orr was directing the 
search for missing persons from the air when the helicopter collided with overhead power 
lines and crashed. At the time of this accident, Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Grayson and 
Rat Air, Inc. were assisting the Uintah County Sheriffs Office in that search without 
compensation. 
4. In Orr I, Plaintiffs sued Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Grayson and Rat Air, 
Inc. for their actions involving Detective Orr's death. These Defendants raised their 
volunteer status as a defense under both the Utah Volunteer Services Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63G-8-101, et seq. and the Volunteer Government Worker's Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 67-20-1,*/*e$. 
5. On October 29, 2008, Uintah County filed in Orr I a Motion in Orr I 
asking to be allowed to intervene and to substitute itself in the place instead of Pete 
Martin Drilling, Inc., Brian Grayson and Rat Air, Inc. The very issues Plaintiffs are now 
raising in Orr II. 
5 
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6. Intervention was sought based upon the County's determination that 
these Defendants were volunteers at the time of Detective Orr's death so as to qualify as 
County employees and, therefore, entitled to immunity. Hence, in Orr /Utah County 
asked to be substituted as a proper party Defendant in the place and instead of Pete Martin 
Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Grayson. 
7. Plaintiffs opposed that Motion. In addition, Plaintiffs' asked for and 
received from the District Court a continuance in order to conduct discovery as to the 
volunteer status of these Defendants. A copy of the Court's Ruling allowing for this 
discovery is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
8. Plaintiffs conducted that discovery, including deposing the Uintah County 
Commission, present and former Uintah County Sheriffs, present and former Chief 
Deputy Sheriffs and the County personnel director. Plaintiffs also undertook extensive 
document discovery on this issue. 
9. Upon completion of that discovery, Uintah County renewed its 
Motion to intervene and substitute. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs commenced the instant action, 
Orr II, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah on 
November 4, 2008. Plaintiffs obviously did so in anticipation of Judge Anderson's 
Ruling in Orr L 
6 
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10. It is also important to note that in Orr II, although Plaintiffs are seeking to 
litigate substantive issues with respect to Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and 
Brian Grayson, these entities and individual are not named as party Defendants. 
11. Thereafter, on April 8,2009, Judge Anderson issued his Ruling and Order 
in Orr I finding that Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and Grayson were not 
volunteers so as to be Uintah County employees. Judge Anderson also found that Uintah 
County, therefore, was not entitled to intervene and be substituted in the place and instead 
of these Defendants. Again, the very issues Plaintiffs are attempting to re-litigate in Orr 
IL 
12. It is not surprising, therefore, that this matter was transferred from the Third 
Judicial District Court to the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County. 
That transfer having occurred, the issue is now what effect Judge Anderson's Ruling has 
upon this action. Uintah County respectfully submits that Judge Anderson's Ruling 
requires that Orr II be dismissed with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs had a full and fair hearing on the issue of Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat 
Air, Inc. and Grayson's status as volunteers and whether Uintah County should be 
substituted in the place and instead as a Defendant. The Plainitffs are entitled to one but 
7 
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not more than one fair hearing on these issues, which they have received Consequently, 
the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel preclude Plaintiffs from commencing 
a new action, Orr I, in hopes of obtaining a different result This is true even when the 
prior action, Orr I, is still pending. See City o/Des Moines v. $81,231, 943 P.2d 669, 
675-76 (Wash. App. 1997)(Dismissing second filed lawsuit even though prior action 
between parties was on appeal and had not yet resulted in a final judgment). Thus, under 
the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel Plaintiffs' Complaint in Orr II must be 
dismissed. Yet, the res judicata and collateral estoppel effect of Judge Anderson's ruling 
in Orr I is not the only reason Orr II should be dismissed with prejudice. 
Another hurdle Plaintiffs must overcome in attempting to re-litigate the issue of 
volunteer status and Uintah County's liability in the event Pete Martin, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. 
or Grayson are considered, as a matter of law, to be County employees as a result of their 
volunteer status. The law of the case doctrine raises another such hurdle. The law of the 
case doctrine is a restriction self-imposed by Courts in the interest of judicial efficiency. 
Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436,444 (1912). It is a rule based on sound public 
policy that litigation should come to an end. Todd Shipyards v. Auto Transport, S.A., 763 
F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1985). Simply put, it is designed to bring about a quick resolution of 
8 
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disputes by preventing continued argument of issues already decided. Major v. Benton, 
647F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981). 
Usually the law of the case doctrine requires the District Court to adhere to its 
prior rulings, adhere to the rulings of an appellate court, or to adhere to another judge's 
rulings in the same case. But it also applies, as in the instant case, to a Court's prior ruling 
in a closely related case. See Lyden By and Through Lyden v. Weiner, 913 P.2d 451,454 
(Wyo. 1996). In the present case, the law of the case doctrine applies because the same 
issues were decided by Judge Anderson when he denied Uintah County's Motion to 
Intervene and Substitute. See Gage v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 796 F.2d 345, 349-50 (10th 
Cir. 1986)(app lying the law of the case doctrine with respect to a state Court's 
factual/issue determination to a subsequent federal court proceeding involving the same 
parties). Plaintiffs' attempt in Orr II at an end run around Judge Anderson's Ruling also 
triggers the doctrine of comity which is, under the circumstances of this case, a variation 
of the law of the case doctrine. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned "that one District Court judge 
cannot overrule another District Court judge of equal authority." According to the Utah 
Supreme Court, this a branch of what is generally terms "the law of the case" doctrine 
which has evolved to avoid the delays and difficulties that arise when one judge is 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
presented with an issue identical to one which has already been passed upon by a 
coordinate judge in the same case. Plaintiffs will, of course, argue that this is not the 
same case. But it is the identical issue between the identical parties before Judge 
Anderson and therefore the same case. More importantly, the Hawaii Supreme Court had 
the following poignant observations regarding what Plaintiffs are attempting to do in this 
second filed suit: 
The normal hesitancy that a Court would have in modifying its own prior 
rulings is even greater when a judge is asked to vacate the order of a brother 
or sister judge. The general rule which requires adherence to a prior 
interlocutory order of another judge of the same court thus commands even 
greater respect than the doctrine of 4law of the case5 which refers to the 
usual practice of courts to refuse to disturb all prior rulings in a particular 
case, including rulings made by the judge himself, (citations omitted) 
Unless cogent reasons support the second court's action, any modification 
of a prior ruling of another court of equal and concurrent jurisdiction will be 
deemed an abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted) 
Long v. City& Cnty. of Honolulu, 665 P.2d 157, 162 (Hawaii 1983) (emphasis in 
original). 
Finally, Plaintiffs' attempt at an end run is likewise precluded by the First Filed 
Rule, which provides that when two lawsuits have been filed involving the same subject 
matter and/or issue, the Court in which the second filed suit is pending lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction to decide the matter. A point the Utah Supreme Court made clear in 
Nielson v. Scchiller, 66 P.2d 365 (Utah 1937)when it stated that: "Where two actions 
10 
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between the same parties . . . to test the same rights are brought in courts having 
concurrent jurisdiciton, the court which first acquires jurisdiction •. • retains its 
jurisdiction . . . and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with its 
[the first court's] actions". Id. at 66 P.2d 368(emphasis added). See also, Mutual of 
Enumclaw v. Washington State Human Rights Comm.> 692 P.2d 882, 884 (Wash. App. 
1984)(when the jurisdiction of two tribunals is invoked concerning the same subject or 
controversy, the tribunal first obtaining jurisdiction has the power to decide the 
controversy to the exclusion of the other). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, Plaintiffs' Complaint in Orr //should be dismissed 
with prejudice. Simply put, the issue of Peter Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and 
Bryan Grayson's status as County employees and Uintah County's potential liability to 
Plaintiffs should these Defendants be found to be volunteer/employees was resolved in 
Orr L Consequently, allowing Plaintiffs to re-try these matters in Orr //would not only 
be a needless waste of judicial resources, but it would also run the risk of inconsistent 
rulings, which the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel comity, and the First 
Filed Rule are intended to prevent. 
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DATED this 3rd day of January ,2010. 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
v * / /UL*rJL~+—» 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
John H. Gothard, Jr. 
Deputy Uintah County Attorney 
Attorneys for Uintah County, Utah 
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m THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Claudia Orr and Eugene Orr, individually, on 
behalf of their deceased son, Kevin Orr, Holly 
Orr, individually and on behalf of the estate 
and heirs of Kevin Orr, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Brian Grayson, Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat 
Air, Inc., and Moon Lake Electric 
Association, Inc., 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH'S 
COMBINED MOTION AND 
MEMORANDUM RE: 
INTERVENTION AND 
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES 
Case No. 070800045 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Uintah County's Motion to Intervene. Brian Grayson, 
Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., and Rat Air, Inc., join in support of the Motion. Plaintiffs oppose the 
Motion. 
Background Facts 
On November 25,2006, the Uintah County Sheriffs Office was searching for a missmg 
woman. On that date, the Uintah County Deputy Sheriff Robert E. Vandebusse asked Pete 
Martin Drilling, Inc., to use its helicopter and pilot to assist in the search for the missmg woman. 
Deputy Sheriff Vandebusse made the request to Lori Martin, the secretary and treasurer of Pete 
Martin Drilling. Lori Martin told Deputy Sheriff Vandebusse that the Sheriffs Office could use 
the helicopter. There was no offer to pay for the helicopter services, nor was there any request 
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for payment. Lori Martin then contacted Brian Grayson, the helicopter pilot for Pete Martin 
Drilling, and told him to go the airport to pilot the helicopter in search of the missing woman. 
Detective Kevin Orr, from the Uintah County Sheriffs Office, volunteered to go up in the 
helicopter to search for the missing woman. The helicopter search area was just south of the 
Jensen Bridge over the Green River. As Mr. Grayson and Detective Orr were orbiting the search 
area, the helicopter struck power lines and crashed. Detective Orr died as a result of the crash. 
On January 26,2007, the heirs of Detective Orr filed a complaint against the Defendants. 
On February 15,2007, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Brian Grayson, Pete Martin 
Drilling, and Rat Air (collectively called the Helicopter Defendants) raised the Utah Volunteer 
Government Workers Act and the Governmental Immunity Act in their answer. Thereafter, the 
Uintah County Commissioners approved the Helicopter Defendants' status as volunteers under 
the Volunteer Government Workers Act in August, 2007. Joe McKea, the Human Resources 
Director for Uintah County, ratified the County Commissioners' approval of the Helicopter 
Defendants' status as volunteers on December 7, 2007. 
Analysis 
Uintah County's Motion to Intervene is based on their claim that the Helicopter 
Defendants were volunteer government employees under the Volunteer Government Workers 
Act ("Workers Act"), Utah Code Ann § 67-20-1 et seq. Under the Workers Act, a volunteer 
government worker is considered a government employee. A volunteer government worker is 
protected by governmental immunity. Therefore. Uintah County claims that the Plaintiffs' 
exclusive remedy under the Governmental Immunity Act is to sue the governmental entity. 
Consequently, Uintah County argues they have a right to intervene under Rule 24(a) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Plaintiffs oppose the Motion arguing that the Helicopter Defendants were not 
volunteer government workers, and the Workers Act does not apply. The Plaintiffs argue that 
because the Workers Act does not apply the Helicopter Defendants are not shielded by 
governmental immunity, and Uintah County has no right to intervene. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs 
argue that Mr. Grayson does not qualify as a volunteer under the Workers Act because he was 
compensated by Pete Martin Drilling. Also, the Plaintiffs argue that Pete Martin Drilling and Rat 
Air cannot qualify as volunteers under the Workers Act because the Act requires volunteers to be 
natural, living human beings. 
The Court has thoroughly reviewed all the pleadings. For purposes of deciding this 
Motion, three issues will be examined. First, whether Pete Martin Drilling and Rat Air, as 
corporations, can be volunteers under the Workers Act. Second, whether Mr. Grayson can be a 
volunteer under the Workers Act even though he received compensation from his employer. 
Third, whether the Helicopter Defendants were volunteer government workers under the Workers 
Act. 
I. Whether Pete Martin Drilling and Rat Air, as corporations, can be volunteers under the 
Volunteer Government Workers Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-20-2(3)(a) defines "volunteer" as "anyperson who donates services 
without pay or other compensation except expenses actually and reasonably incurred as approved 
by the supervising agency." The term "person" is not defined in the Workers Act The Plaintiffs 
argue that a volunteer must be a natural, living human being to be considered a volunteer. The 
Plaintiffs argue that Pete Martin Drilling and Rat Air are corporations, not persons, and therefore 
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do not qualify as volunteers under the Workers Act. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that the 
examples of volunteers given throughout the Workers Act are all natural human beings. 
First, while this chapter of the Utah Code does not define the term "person", other 
chapters do. The definition of "person" in the Utah Code often includes businesses and 
corporations. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 36-11-102(12), Lobbyist Disclosure and 
Regulation Act, defines "person" as "individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partnerships, 
associations, and companies," Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-3(22), Condominium Ownership Act, 
defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, trustee, or other legal 
entity." In comparison, the term "individual" is also defined in multiple chapters of the Utah 
Code. In Utah Code Ann. § 26-33a-102(l 1), "individual" is defined as "a natural person." 
Based on the many instances of the word "person" being defined in the Utah Code, it is clear to 
this Court that person includes both natural human beings and organizations like corporations 
and businesses. The Court is also convinced that the legislature uses the term "individual" when 
referring to a natural human being. 
Clearly, whether a person includes corporations or businesses depends on the context and 
type of statute involved. However, there is no reason to believe that the use of the term person in 
the Workers Act excludes businesses or corporations. Corporations and businesses volunteer all 
of the time. Many corporations volunteer their workforce to provide volunteer services in a 
variety of circumstances. Also, there may be instances where a government agency is in need of 
a specialized or expensive piece of equipment. Typically, corporations often own that type of 
equipment, not individuals. Here, Pete Martin Drilling owned the helicopter that the Uintah 
County Sheriffs Office needed to search for a missing woman. Without a corporations ability to 
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be considered a volunteer, a corporation may be reluctant to provide equipment and equipment 
operators to a government in need. 
The Court finds that corporations are considered persons for purposes of the Workers 
Act. 
II. Whether Mr. Grayson can be considered a volunteer under the Volunteer Government 
Workers Act when he was compensated by his employer. 
Again, Utah Code Ann. § 67-20-2 defines "volunteer" as "any person who donates 
service without pay or other compensation except expenses actually and reasonably incurred as 
approved by the supervising agency." The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Grayson was not a volunteer 
because he was paid his salary as a helicopter pilot by Pete Martin Drilling. 
Clearly, the relationship the Workers Act focuses on is the relationship between the 
volunteer and the agency accepting the volunteer services. The person providing the services is 
a volunteer so long as the agency accepting the volunteer services does not compensate for the 
services. In other words, whether a person is a volunteer is determined from the perspective of 
the agency receiving the services. It is of no consequence to the agency receiving the services 
whether a person volunteering is being paid by someone else. The person is a volunteer, as far as 
the agency is concerned, if the agency does not pay them. 
Here, there is no evidence Mr, Grayson was compensated by Uintah County for his 
helicopter services. Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Grayson could be a volunteer under the 
Workers Act even though he was paid by his employer Pete Martin Drilling. 
000205 
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III. Whether the Helicopter Defendants qualify as volunteer government workers under the 
Workers Act. 
The final issue is whether the Helicopter Defendants were volunteer government workers 
under the Workers Act. Specifically, the issue is whether the Workers Act requires volunteer 
services to be pre-approved. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-20-4 states: 
A volunteer may not donate any service to an agency unless the volunteer's sendees 
are approved by the chief executive of that agency or his authorized representative, 
and by the office of personnel having jurisdiction over that agency. 
Here, approval of the Helicopter Defendants5 service by the Uintah County 
Commissioners came after the Helicopter Defendants provided the service. The Plaintiffs argue 
that the Workers Act requires volunteer services be approved before the service is rendered, 
Uintah County and the Helicopter Defendants argue that the statute does not require pre-
approval, but simply requires approval of the volunteer services. 
The plain language of the statute requires that the volunteer services be pre-approved. 
While the statute does not explicitly use the words "prior approval" or "pre-approval", the statute 
does indicate that a person may not volunteer unless the services are approved. That is another 
way of saying a volunteer services must be pre-approved. If a person cannot volunteer unless 
approved, logic dictates that the statute requires volunteer services be pre-approved. There 
would be no reason for the legislature to use language stating a "volunteer may not donate" 
unless prior approval was required. 
Also, Uintah County argues that the Workers Act is a remedial statute designed to 
encourage people to volunteer. Uintah County argues that construing this remedial statute 
P * fo 000204 
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liberally requires the Court to find that pre approval is not required. However, after the fact 
approval would not encourage people to volunteer. After the fact approval would likely 
discourage people to volunteer. The Workers Act provides a volunteer such things as workers' 
compensation coverage, governmental immunity from suit and volunteer experience credit. No 
volunteer would be encouraged to render their services if those benefits were not established for 
them before hand. In other words, if the benefits the Workers Act provides are the carrot that 
entice people to volunteer, that carrot needs to be offered before the volunteer provides the 
services, not after. If a volunteer is encouraged to be a volunteer government worker because of 
the benefit of being provided with immunity, worker's compensation, and volunteer experience 
credit, that benefit would need to be ensured to the volunteer before the service is rendered. 
Furthermore, the parties have not given, nor is the Court aware of, any explanation of 
what purpose approval of a volunteer's services after the fact would serve. There is no reason 
this Court can imagine for the legislature to craft a statute requiring approval of volunteer 
services if approval after the fact was sufficient. After the fact approval leads to a situation 
where the agency receiving the volunteer services decides whether the volunteer should be 
shielded by governmental immunity in the event an injury occurs. Approval after the fact would 
allow the governmental agency, not a judge or a jury, to decide lawsuits after they are filed. 
Throughout the pleadings dealing with this Motion, the question was raised of the 
practicality of getting approval for a volunteer service under emergency circumstances Simply 
put, that is not a question this Court has to decide. This Court merely has to use the statutes that 
the legislature has provided and follow them. The Workers Act requires approval of the 
volunteer's services, in an emergency situation or otherwise, and prohibits a volunteer from 
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providing those services until they are approved. 
Here, the Helicopter Defendants provided their services to the Uintah County Sheriffs 
Office before those services were approved. The statute clearly prohibits that sequence. The 
approval of the Helicopter Defendants' services came months after the accident, and months after 
the suit was filed. The Court finds that the Workers Act requires approval before the services are 
rendered. Therefore, the Workers Act does not apply in this situation. Consequently, there is no 
basis for Uintah County to intervene in this matter. Uintah County's Motion to Intervene and the 
Helicopter Defendants joinder in that Motion, is denied. 
Finally, the Helicopter Defendants make the alternative argument that summary judgment 
should enter in their favor based on the loaned employee doctrine. The Helicopter Defendants 
argue that Brian Grayson was loaned to Uintah County and their employee. The Helicopter 
Defendants Motion under this alternative basis is denied for the reasons set forth by Uintah 
County in their Reply Memo. The loaned employee doctrine has no application to a 
governmental entity under Utah law. The method for becoming an employee of the government 
under these types of circumstances is provided for by statute. Therefore, the common law loaned 
employee doctrine has been preempted by statute. 
Furthermore, under Utah law the loaned employee doctrine "provides that if a labor 
service loans an employee to a special employer for the performance of work, then the employee, 
with respect to that work, is the employee of the special employer for whom the work or service 
is performed" Ghersi v Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Utah 1994). The loaned employee 
applies when "the employee has made a contract of hire . . . with the special employ er[.]" Id. 
Here, there is no evidence that any of the involved parties made a contract for hire. 
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Furthermore, none of the parties could be properly characterized as a labor service. Therefore, 
the loaned employee doctrine does not apply. The Helicopter Defendants' alternative motion for 
summary judgment is denied. 
Dated this $ day of Uf/hjul , 2009. 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
fy *ti 
Claudia Orr and Eugene Orr, 
individually, on behalf of their 
deceased son, Kevin Orr, Holly 
Orr, individually and on behalf 




Brian Grayson, Pete Martin 
Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc., 
and Moon Lake Electric 
Association, Inc., 
De f endant s . ,;; rj£> £ r 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 070800045 
Judge JOHN R> ANDERSON 
:T* 
XV 
This matter is before the court on the Plaintiff's Motion for a 
Rule 56(f) Continuance. 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, 
the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just, 
*[R]ule 56(f) motions opposing a summary judgment motion on the 
ground that discovery has not been completed should be granted 
liberally unless they are deemed -dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt 
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Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop.
 t 48 P.3d 910, 917 (Utah 2002). 
"A rule 56(f) motion has merit when it targets core issues that 
might defeat the pending summary judgment motion." Energy Mgmt. 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Shaw, 110 P.3d 158, 161 {Utah App. 2005). 
UA party's rule 56(f) motion for a continuance is not dilatory if 
the party has already initiated discovery proceedings, diligently 
seeks access to information that is within the sole control of the 
adverse party, and is denied an adequate opportunity to conduct the 
desired discovery," Id. at 161. 
Here, the Plaintiff's motion has merit. The Plaintiff seeks to 
depose certain Uintah County officials concerning the circumstances of 
the "helicopter'' pilots status as volunteers. The information those 
officials provide might defeat the pending summary judgment motion. 
The Plaintiff's motion is not dilatory. The Plaintiff has wanted 
to depose these individuals but the attorney responsible for this case 
resigned. The depositions were' cancelled but timely rescheduled once 
another attorney within the firm took over. Therefore, the Plaintiff 
has already initiated discovery proceedings, and has diligently sought 
access to the information. 
Finally, because the motion has merit and is not dilatory, a 
continuance should be liberally granted. 
The Plaintiff's motion for* a rule 56(f) continuance is granted. 
The oral argument hearing scheduled for January 15, 2008 will be 
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continued without a date set. 
^l5« Dated this y\ day of i Q& , 2007, 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judcfe 
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Plaintiffs' also submit their Opposition to Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss. 
MEMORANDUM 
Any case against Uintah County is not properly venued in Uintah County. The Durham 
case is controlling Supreme Court authority. See Durham v. Duchesne County, 893 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1995). Plaintiffs cannot be forced to litigate their case against the County on its own 
courthouse steps. See id at 583, Plaintiffs request that this case be venued in any adjacent 
county, or Salt Lake County because all the law firms involved in the case are located in Salt 
Lake County. If Defendant prefers, the case against Uintah County can be transferred to another 
county adjacent to Uintah County by stipulation. 
If the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Change of Venue in this action, Plaintiffs hereby 
submit their Opposition to Uintah County's Motion to Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT HAVE A FAIR TRIAL AGAINST UINTAH COUNTY 
WHILE VENUED IN UINTAH COUNTY 
This action should be transferred away from Uintah County because Plaintiffs cannot be 
forced to litigate against Uintah County in Uintah County. hiDurham v. Duchesne County, 893 
P.2d 581 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged: 
[a] disadvantage of being required to sue a county for damages in its own courthouse. 
This disadvantage is magnified in small rural counties where jurors will also be county 
taxpayers with an incentive to keep their taxes and, consequently, any damage award low. 
Permitting actions against counties to be tried in adjoining counties guards against the risk 
of local prejudice and affords litigants a relatively convenient alternative forum in which 
to bring their actions without the need to demonstrate bias or impartiality. 
See id. at 583. Plaintiffs will be severely prejudiced if they have to litigate its case against the 
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County in Uintah County. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a neutral jury in its case against Uintah 
County. A large majority of the witnesses at trial will be county personnel and other residents of 
Vernal. Over two dozen depositions have been taken in this case and more have yet to be taken. 
Given the sheer number of witnesses and the small size of the town of Vernal, it will be difficult 
to obtain a jury who does not know one or more of the individuals deposed. Finally, Detective 
Orr was a prominent citizen who was recognized for his service to the community. Given these 
factors, it will be nearly impossible to seat a jury in Vernal 
Plaintiffs' respectfully request that venue be transferred to a county adjacent to Uintah 
County or Salt Lake County. Plaintiffs' also request that this action be stayed. 
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 
I, PLAINTIFFS STILL HAVE A VIABLE CLAIM AGAINST UINTAH 
COUNTY 
This case should not be dismissed because if the appellate courts reverse, then Plaintiffs 
will be left without a remedy. This Complaint must be left on file to protect Plaintiffs from 
statute of limitations problems in the event of Defendant succeeding upon such appeal. There 
were two questions decided by Jude Anderson. First, were the Pete Martin Defendants 
volunteers under Utah Code Ann. §67-20-1 See id. Second, did the Pete Martin Defendants 
provide voluntary services under §63G-8-201. Judge Anderson expressly and implicitly decided 
both questions in the negative. The Pete Martin Defendants petitioned for review which was 
denied. This action protects Plaintiffs' rights against the County in the event of a reversal of 
Judge Anderson's rulings. 
This case involves a search and rescue mission where Brian Grayson, in the course and 
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scope of his employment with Pete Martin Drilling ("PMD"), flew into Moon Lake's power 
lines, killing Detective Orr, All events occurred in Uintah County, where a lawsuit was filed 
against Grayson, Rat Air, and Pete Martin Drilling (the "helicopter defendants") as well as Moon 
Lake Electric Association, Inc. ("Orr i"). 
In their answer to Orr /, Plaintiffs learned that Grayson and the other corporate defendants 
were claiming to be volunteers under the Volunteer Government Workers Act, see Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 67-20-1 et seq., despite the fact that Grayson was being paid for his work by Ms 
employer and despite the lack of approval of his services as provided by statute. The Volunteer 
Government Workers Act considers volunteers as government employees for the purpose of 
receiving workers' compensation benefits. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-20-3 (2008). A volunteer 
is defined as "any person who donates service without pay or other compensation except 
expenses actually and reasonably incurred as approved by the supervising agency." See id. § 67-
20-2. The Act has the effect of making a volunteer a quasi-employee of the government because 
the volunteer is indemnified in the same way that the government would indemnify any paid 
government employee. See id § 67-20-3(1)©). At this point the County made a Motion to 
Intervene, claiming they were responsible for the acts of the helicopter defendants. Because the 
County claimed such responsibility, Plaintiffs also had to file suit against the County, so that 
there would be a complaint on file (Orr II). After extensive briefing, Judge Anderson ruled that 
the helicopter defendants were not government workers within the meaning of the A ct, because 
the county did not give prior approval but should the helicopter defendants lose on this point at 
trial they may appeal Judge Anderson's determination and the outcome of such an appeal is, of 
course, uncertain. See Exhibit L Ruling and Order. 
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Also at issue, and extensively briefed in the County's Motion to Intervene, is the 
Immunity for Persons Performing Voluntary Services Act The Services Act applies to the 
helicopter services donated by the helicopter defendants. The Services Act provides: 
Any person performing services on a voluntary basis, without compensation, under the 
general supervision of, and on behalf of any public entity, shall be immune from liability 
with respect to any decisions or actions, other than in connection with the operation of a 
gjotor vehicle, taken during the course of those services, unless it is established that such 
decisions or actions were grossly negligent, not made in good faith, or were made 
maliciously. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-8- 201. Judge Anderson also implicitly found this Act inapplicable, in v 
the event of reversal or further proceeding Plaintiffs would contend that Grayson was grossly 
negligent in flying the helicopter. However, if it is found that he was not, the County can still be 
sued for the conduct of its service providers or its workers. After reversal, if the facts in this case 
are such that the County is found to be responsible for the conduct of the helicopter defendants, 
and Bryan Grayson is found to be a service provider or a worker, then the County would be 
liable. It is apparent in Judge Anderson's ruling that there was no basis for the County to 
intervene and claim responsibility for the helicopter defendants, and thus he denied their motion. 
See Exhibit 1. Ruling and Order. Therefore, this Complaint is prophylactic. 
In order to preserve their claim against the County, Plaintiffs filed Orr II, against Uintah 
County. If the helicopter defendants are found to be service providers or volunteer government 
workers, by an appellate court, then the County is responsible. Plaintiffs made it clear on the 
face of the Complaint that it was filed to prevent the running of the statute of limitations against 
the County in the event of reversal. The problem is, however, that the Defendants now claim that 
they were providing volunteer services for the County under the Volunteer Services Act, see Utah 
5 
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Code Ann. § 63~30b-l, renotified at 63G-8-101. Plaintiff believes this issue has been waived by 
the arguments presented to Judge Anderson. See Exhibit 2. Letter from Roger BullocL 
Although it is the law of the case that the helicopter defendants are not voluntary 
government workers, that ruling is ultimately appealable and such outcome is unpredictable. 
Additionally, per Pete Martin, the law of the case does not preclude litigating whether the 
helicopter defendants were performing voluntary services. Thus this issue is yet to be argued and 
tried If and when the helicopter defendants lose again before the trial court, they may and will 
appeal that decision as well as Judge Anderson's decision finding that one cannot be retroactively 
declared a government worker. 
If the finder of fact finds the helicopter defendants to be service providers, or, if the 
appeals court finds that Judge Anderson erroneously concluded that the helicopter defendants 
were not government workers, Plaintiffs have a claim against the County. In either of the above 
two situations, the County has potential liability for the conduct of the helicopter defendants. 
Plaintiffs are constrained by well understood time limitations to file a complaint within one year 
after serving a notice of claim against a governmental entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-7-401. 
Plaintiffs served a notice of claim on Uintah County on November 8,2007. Uintah County did 
not respond. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint in Third District on November 8, 2008, within one 
year of filing its notice of claim. See id. Plaintiffs were forced do this within the one year statute 
of limitations or waive their rights under the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. If this Complaint 
is dismissed, the Government Immunity Act may preclude Plaintiffs alternative Complaint 
against the County. 
6 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully ask this Court to change the venue of this action, or in the 
alternative, deny the County's Motion to Dismiss and hold this matter in abeyance. 
Dated this jv_ day of January, 2010. 
STEELE & BIGGS 
JOSEPH W. STEELE 
KENNETH D.LOUGEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff's 
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RECEIVED 
APR 1 5 2009 
yiMlftHCOUNTYATTOBe 
-*F% Vi'V^ IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
% 
Claudia Oxr and Eugene Orx, individually, on 
behalf of their deceased son, Kevin Orr, Holly 
Orr, individually and on behalf of the estate 
and heirs of Kevin Orr, 
Plaintifis, 
vs. 
Brian Grayson, Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat 
Air, Inc., and Moon Lake Electric 
Association, Inc., 
Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH'S 
COMBINED MOTION AND 
MEMORANDUM RE: 
INTERVENTION AND 
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES 
Case No. 070800045 
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Uintah County's Motion to Intervene, Brian Grayson, 
Pete Martin Drilling, Inc, and Rat Air, Inc., join in support of tihe Motion, Plaintiffs oppose the 
Motion. 
Background Facts 
On November 25,2006, the Uintah County Sheriffs Office was searching for a missing 
woman, On that date, the Uintah County Deputy Sheriff Robert E, Vandebusse asked Pete 
Martin Drilling, Inc., to use its helicopter and pilot to assist in the search for the missing woman. 
Deputy Sheriff Vandebusse made the request to Lori Martin, the secretary and treasurer of Pete 
Martin Drilling, Lori Martin told Deputy Sheriff Vandebusse that the Sheriffs Office could use 
the helicopter. There was no offer to pay for the helicopter services, nor was there any request 
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for payment, Lori Martin then contacted Brian Graysqn, the helicopter pilot for Pete Martin 
Drilling, and told him to go the airport to pilot the helicopter in search of the missing woman. 
Detective Kevin Orr, from the Uintah County Sheriffs Office, volunteered to go up in the 
helicopter to search for the missing woman. The helicopter search area was just south of the 
Jensen Bridge over the Green River. As Mr. Grayson and Detective Orr were orbiting the search 
area> the helicopter struck power lines and crashed. Detective Orr died as a result of the crash. 
On January 26,2007, the heirs of Detective Orr filed a complaint against the Defendants, 
On February 15,2007, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Brian Grayson, Pete Martin 
Drilling, and Rat Air (collectively called the Helicopter Defendants) raised the Utah Volunteer 
Government Workers Act and the Governmental Immunity Act in their answer. Thereafter, the 
Uintah County Commissioners approved the Helicopter Defendants' status as volunteers under 
the Volunteer Government Workers Act in August, 2007. Joe McKea, the Human Resources 
Director for Uintah County, ratified the County Commissioners' approval of the Helicopter 
Defendants' status as volunteers on December 7,2007. 
Analysis 
Uintah County's Motion to Intervene is based on their claim that the Helicopter 
Defendants were volunteer government employees: underJheVolunteer Govgrnmgit Workers 
Act ("Workers Act"), Utah Code Ann § 67-20-1 et seq, Under the Workers Act, a volunteer 
government worker is considered a government employee. A volunteer government worker is 
protected by governmental immunity. Therefore, Uintah County claims that the Plaintiffs' 
exclusive remedy under the Governmental Immunity Act is to sue the governmental entity. 
Consequently, Uintah County argues they have a right to intervene under Rule 24(a) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure, 
The Plaintiffs oppose the Motion arguing that the Helicopter Defendants were not 
volunteer government workers, and the Workers Act does not apply, The Plaintiffs argue that 
because the Workers Act does not apply the Helicopter Defendants are not shielded by 
governmental immunity, and Uintah County has no right to intervene. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs 
argue that Mr. Grayson does not qualify as a volunteer under the Workers Act because he was 
compensated by Pete Martin Drilling, Also, the Plaintiffs argue that Pete Martin Drilling and Rat 
Air cannot qualify as volunteers under the Workers Act because the Act requires volunteers to be 
natural, living human beings. 
The Coxirt has thoroughly reviewed all the pleadings. For purposes of deciding this 
Motion, three issues will be examined, First, whether Pete Martin Drilling and Rat Air, as 
corporations, can be volunteers under the Workers Act. Second, whether Mr, Grayson can be a 
volunteer under the Workers Act even though he received compensation from his employer. 
Third, whether the Helicopter Defendants were volunteer government workers under the Workers 
Act 
L Whether Pete Martin Drilling and Rat Air> as corporations, can be volunteers under the 
Volunteer Government Workers Act, 
Utah Code Ann, § 67-20-2(3)(a) defines "volunteer" as umy person who donates services 
without pay or other compensation except expenses actually and reasonably incurred as approved 
by the supervising agency," The term "person" is not defined in the Workers Act The Plaintiffs 
argue that a volunteer must be a natural, living human being to be considered a volunteer, The 
Plaintiffs argue that Pete Martin Drilling and Rat Air are corporations, not persons, and therefore 
p ft p. ~> r\ Q 
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do not qualify as volunteers under the Workers Act Furthermore the Plaintiffs argue that the 
examples of volunteers given throughout the Workers Act are all natural human beings. 
First, while this chapter of the Utah Code does not define the term "person", other 
chapters do. The definition of "person" in the Utah Code often includes businesses and 
corporations, For example, Utah Code Ann. § 36-11-102(12), Lobbyist Disclosure and 
Regulation Act> defines "person" as "individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partnerships, 
associations, and companies/' Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-3(22), Condominium Ownership Act, 
defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, partnership, association, trustee, or other legal 
entity." In comparison, the term "individual" is also defined in multiple chapters of the Utah 
Code. In Utah Code Ann. § 26-33a-102(11), "individual" is defined as "a natural person." 
Based on the many instances of the word "person" being defined in the Utah Code, it is clear to 
this Court that person includes both natural human beings and organizations like corporations 
and businesses, The Court is also convinced that the legislature uses the term "individual" when 
referring to a natural human being. 
Clearly, whether a person includes corporations or businesses depends on the context and 
type of statute involved. However, there is no reason to believe that the use of the term person in 
the Workers Act excludes businesses or corporations, Corporations and businesses volunteer all 
of the time. Many corporations volunteer their workforce to provide volunteer services in a 
variety of circumstances. Also, there may be instances where a government agency is in need of 
a specialized or expensive piece of equipment. Typically, ooiporations often own that type of 
equipment, not individuals, Here, Pete Martin Drilling owned the helicopter that the Uintah 
County Sheriff5 s Office needed to search for a missing woman. Without a corporations ability to 
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be considered a volunteer, a corporation may be reluctant to provide equipment and equipment 
operators to a government in need. 
The Court finds that corporations are considered persons for purposes of the Workers 
Act. 
n. Whether Mr. Grayson can be considered a volunteer under the Volunteer Government 
Workers Act when he was compensated by his employer* 
Again, Utah Code Ann. § 67-20-2 defines "volunteer" as "any person who donates 
service without pay or other compensation except expenses actually and reasonably incurred as 
approved by the supervising agency." The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Grayson was not a volunteer 
because he was paid his salary as a helicopter pilot by Pete Martin Drilling. 
Clearly, the relationship the Workers Act focuses on is the relationship between the 
volunteer and the agency accepting the volunteer services. The person providing the services is 
a volunteer so long as the agency accepting the volunteer services does not compensate for the 
services. In other words, whether a person is a volunteer is determined from the perspective of 
the agency receiving the sendees. It is of no consequence to the agency receiving the services 
whether a person volunteering is being paid by someone else. The person is a volunteer, as far as 
the agency is concerned, if the agency does not pay them. 
Plere, there is no evidence Mr. Grayson was compensated by Uintah County for his 
helicopter services, Therefore, the Co^fin^thatJ^^Qrgysoir^eui^be a volunteer under the 
Workerg^Act^ even though he was paid by his employer Pete Mgrfe^rilling, 
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III. Whether the Helicopter Defendants qualify as volunteer government workers under the 
Workers Act 
The final issue is whether the Helicopter Defendants were volunteer government workers 
under the Workers Act Specifically, the issue is whether the Workers Act requires volunteer 
services to be pre-approved. 
Utah Code Aim. § 67-204 states: 
A volunteer may not donate any service to an agency unless the volunteer's services 
are approved by fee chief executive of that agency or his authorized representative, 
and by the office of personnel having jurisdiction over that agency, 
Here, approval of the Helicopter Defendants' service by the Uintah County 
Commissioners came after the Helicopter Defendants provided the service. The Plaintiffs argue 
that the Workers Act requires volunteer services be approved before the service is rendered. 
Uintah County and the Helicopter Defendants argue that the statute does not require pre-
approval, but simply requires approval of the volunteer services. 
The plain language of the statute requires that the volunteer services be pre-approved, 
While the statute does not explicitly use the words ''prior approval" or "pre-approval", the statute 
does indicate that a person c m y j ^ t j ^ h B ^ ^ d e s s the services are approved. That is another 
way of saying a volunteer services must be pre-approved. If a person cannot volunteer unless 
approved, logic dictates that the statute requires volunteer services be pre-approved. There 
would be no reason for fee legislature to use language stating a "volunteer may not donate" 
unless prior approval was required, 
Also, Uintah County argues that the Workers Act is a remedial statute designed to 
encourage people to volunteer, Uintah County argues that construing this remedial statute 
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liberally requires the Court to find that pre approval is not required. However* after the fact 
approval would not encourage people to volunteer. After the fact approval would likely 
discourage people to volunteer. The Workers Act provides a volunteer such things as workers' 
compensation coverage, governmental immunity from suit and volunteer experience credit. No 
volunteer would be encouraged to render their services if those benefits were not established for 
them before hand, In other words, if the benefits the Workers Act provides are the carrot that 
entice people to volunteer, that carrot needs to be offered before the volunteer provides the 
services, not after. If a volunteer is encouraged to be a volunteer government worker because of 
the benefit of being provided with immunity, worker's compensation, and volunteer experience 
credit, that benefit would need to be ensured to the volunteer before the service is rendered. 
Furthermore, the parties have not given, nor is the Court aware of, any explanation of 
what purpose approval of a volunteer's services after the fact would serve. There is no reason 
this Court can imagine for the legislature to craft a statute requiring approval of volunteer 
services if approval after the fact was sufficient. After the fact approval leads to a situation 
where the agency receiving the volunteer services decides whether the volunteer should be 
shielded by governmental immunity in the event an injury occurs, Approval after the fact would 
allow the governmental agency, not a judge or a jury, to decide lawsuits after they are filed, 
Throughout the pleadings dealing with this Motion, the question was raised of the 
practicality of getting approval for a volunteer sendee under emergency circumstances Simply 
put, that is not a question this Court has to decide. This Court merely has to use the statutes that 
the legislature has provided and follow them The Workers Act requires approval of the 
volunteer's services, in an emergency situation or otherwise, and prohibits a volunteer from 
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providing those services until they are approved. 
Here, t ie Helicopter Defendants provided their services to the Uintah County Sheriffs 
Office before those services were approved. The statute clearly prohibits that sequence. The 
approval of the Helicopter Defendants* sendees came months after the accident, and months after 
the suit was filed The Court finds that the Workers Act requires approval before the'services are 
rendered. Therefore, the Workers Act does not apply in this situation. Consequently, there is no 
basis for Uintah County to intervene in this matter. Uintah County's Motion to Intervene and the 
Helicopter Defendants joinder in that Motion, is denied, 
Finally, the Helicopter Defendants make the alternative dxgam&nt that summary judgment 
should enter in their favor based on the loaned employee doctrine, The Helicopter Defendants 
argue that Brian Grayson was loaned to Uintah County and their employee. The Helicopter 
Defendants Motion under this alternative basis is denied fox the reasons set forth by Uintah 
County in their Reply Memo. The loaned employee doctrine has no application to a 
governmental entity under Utah law, The method for becoming an employee of the government 
under these types of circumstances is provided for by statute. Therefore, the common law loaned 
employee doctrine has been preempted by statute, 
Furthermore, under Utah law the loaned employee doctrine "provides that if a labor 
service loans an employee to a special employer for the performance of work., then the employee, 
with respect to that work, is the employee of the special employer for whom the work or sendee 
is performed." Ghersi v. Salazar, 883 P.2d 1352,1356 (Utah 1994). Hie loaned employee 
applies when "the employee has made a contract of h i re , . . with the special employer[,]" Id. 
Here, there is no evidence that any of the involved parties made a contract for hire, 
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Furthermore, none of the parties could be properly characterized as a labor service, Therefore, 
the loaned employee doctrine does not apply. The Helicopter Defendants' alternative motion for 
summary judgment is denied. 
Dated this ff day of SMjui _, 2009. 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, District Court Judge 
*•*
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Jesse C. Trentadue 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John H. Gothard, Jr, 
DEPUTY UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Re: Orr v, Uintah County; Civil No. 090800834 
Gentlemen: 
I have received your motion to dismiss and memorandum dated January 3, 2010 in the 
above action. You smt copies to me and to a number of other counsel who do not represent 
parties to Orr v. Uintah County, pursuant to our special appearances, and I thank you for your 
courtesy. 
Your motion and memorandum contain a misstatement which I assume to be inadvertent, 
and which is not necessary to your motion, but which may potentially mislead Judge Payne with 
respect to the separate action of On* v. Grayson, Civil No. 070800045, which is also assigned to 
Judge Payne, and in which my clients Brian Grayson, Pete Martin Drilling, Inc. and Rat Air, 
Inc., are defendants. 
The misstatement is this: At page 3 of your motion and memorandum, you state that in 
Judge Anderson's ruling and order of April 8, 2009, in Orr v, Grayson, he concluded that Pete 
Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc., and Brian Grayson were not volunteers under either the Utah 
Volunieer Services Act or Volunteer Government Workers Act. This statement is incorrect 
because Judge Anderson's ruling and order did not deal with the Utah Volunteer Services Act1 
but only with the Volunteer Government Workers Act2. 
oo 0.^4 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §63~30b-l et seq., now remembered as §63G~8-101 et. seq. 
2
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In Orr v. Grayson, the County's motion, in which my clients joined, was to substitute the 
County as a defendant based on my clients' volunteer status under the Workers Act. Judge 
Anderson denied that motion. The County's motion and my clients' joinder did not raise the 
issue of the separate Services Act 
Your motion and memorandum are correct in paragraph 4 that my clients raised their 
volunteer status as a defense under both the Sendees Act and the Workers Act in their answer in 
Orrv. Grayson* My clients intend to defend themselves at trial on the basis of immunity under 
the Services Act, as well as other defenses. 
Your misstatement that Judge Anderson's ruling pertained to the Services Act may 
incorrectly inform Judge Payne that the Services Act will not be available as a defense for my 
clients at trial. 
For this reason, it is important that you immediately file a correction to your motion and 
memorandum in which you clarify that the Services Act was not before Judge Anderson and he 
did not address it in his ruling. 
If for any reason you are not able to file and serve this correction immediately, please 
notify me so I can take necessary action. Thank you for your cooperation. 
Yours very tody, 
RHB/cas 
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Deputy County Attorney 
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Attorneys for Uintah County, Utah 
EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLAUDIA ORR and EUGENE ORR, 
individually, on behalf of their deceased 
son, KEVIN ORR, HOLLY ORR, 
individually and on behalf of the estate and 
heirs of KEVIN ORR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant. 
UINTAH COUNTY'S COMBINED 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE 
Civil No. 090800834 
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Uintah County, Utah hereby submits this Memorandum both in further support of 
its Motion to Dismiss and in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Change Venue. 
ARGUMENT 
In its opening Memorandum, Uintah County argued that because Plaintiffs had a 
full and fair hearing in Orr I on the issue of Pete Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and 
Grayson's ("Helicopter Defendants") status as volunteers the doctrines ofres judicata or 
collateral estoppel preclude Plaintiffs from commencing this new action Orr II in hopes 
of obtaining a different result. See City ofDes Moines v. $81,231, 943 P.2d 669, 675-76 
(Wash. App. 1997)(Dismissing second filed lawsuit even though prior action between 
parties was on appeal and had not yet resulted in a final judgment). In their opposition 
Memorandum, Plaintiffs never responded to this argument. 
In its opening Memorandum, Uintah County likewise argued that the law of the 
case doctrine precluded this lawsuit because Judge Anderson had decided the same issue 
in Orr I See Gage v. Gen'l Motors Corp,, 796 F.2d 345, 349-50 (10th Cir.l986)(applying 
law of the case doctrine with respect to a state Court's factual/issue determination to a 
subsequent federal court proceeding involving the same parties). In their opposition 
Memorandum, Plaintiffs never addressed this argument. 
In its opening Memorandum, Uintah County argued that Judge Anderson's Ruling 
in Orr /also triggered the doctrine ofcomity which means that one District Court judge 
2 
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cannot overrule another District Court judge of equal authority. See Long v. City & Cnty. 
of Honolulu, 665 P.2d 157,162 (Hawaii 1983)(Unless cogent reasons support the second 
court's action, any modification of a prior ruling of another court of equal and concurrent 
jurisdiction will be deemed an abuse of discretion). In their opposition Memorandum, 
Plaintiffs ignored this argument, too. 
Finally, in its opening Memorandum, Uintah County argued that this second 
lawsuit on the same issues was precluded by the First Filed Rule, which provides that 
when two lawsuits have been filed involving the same subject matter and/or issue, the 
Court in which the second filed suit is pending lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide 
the matter. See Nielson v. Scchiller, 66 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah 1937)( "Where two actions 
between the same parties . . . to test the same rights are brought in courts having 
concurrent jurisdiciton, the court which first acquires jurisdiction .. . retains its 
jurisdiction . . . and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with its [the first 
court's] actions"). In their opposition Memorandum, Plaintiffs never mentioned this 
argument. 
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Instead of responding to the foregoing arguments,1 Plaintiffs contend that rather 
than dismissal, this case should be stayed in the event an appellate court finds that Judge 
Anderson erroneously concluded that the Helicopter Defendants were not government 
workers or the jury in Orr I finds that the Helicopter Defendants were volunteer services 
providers so as to in effect make them County employees for purposes of Plaintiff s 
claims. Based on these contentions, Plaintiffs ask that the Motion to Dismiss be denied 
and that this case be stayed until Orr I is brought to a final conclusion. Plaintiffs also 
contend that venue should be changed. Plaintiffs even ask to have this case transferred 
back to Salt Lake County from whence it had originally been transferred to Uintah 
County for lack of proper venue! 
Plaintiffs insist that venue should be changed because they will be severely 
prejudiced if they have to litigate claims against Uintah County in Uintah County. These 
arguments all fail under the doctrine of res judicata and the one action rule both of which 
prevent splitting causes of action. 
With respect to the possibility that Judge Anderson's Ruling in Orr /will be 
reversed on appeal, that does not appear to be possible. Judge Anderson's Order denying 
1
 Because Plaintiffs never responded to the foregoing arguments, these points of law are 
conceded. . See U.S. v. Garcia, 52 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1253 (D. Kan. 1999); Super Film of 
America v. UCB Films, 219 F.R.D. 649, 660 (D. Kan. 2004); Hinsdale v. City of Liberal 
Kansas, 19 Fed. Appx. 749, 768, 2001 WL 980781 (10th Cir. 2001). 
4 
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Uintah County's Motion to Intervene was entered April 10, 2009. An order denying 
intervention is a collateral order subject to immediate appeal. See Dickinson v. 
Peteroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 573 (1950); United States v. City of 
Oakland, California, 958 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1992). Since no appeal was taken from that 
Ruling within the 30 days required under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, an 
Appellate Court would not have jurisdiction to consider the matter. The same finality 
would be accorded any jury decision in Orr I finding that the Helicopter Defendants were 
in fact providing voluntary services so as to be considered County employees. 
This result would be the product of the one action rule which prohibits splitting 
causes of action. This rule requires that all negligence claims arising out of one 
occurrence must be determined in one action. In other words, when there is an identity of 
facts and evidence, all claims arising out of an accident must be brought in one suit. See 
Maoris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Utah 2000). 
One purpose of the rule against splitting causes of action is to prevent multiple 
lawsuits on a single cause of action. The one action rule differs from res judicata in that 
res judicata requires an identity of parties whereas the one action rule does not. See 
Diderich v. Yarnvbich, 196 P.3d 411,421 (Kan. 2008). Both res judicata and the one 
action rule, however, require a prior judgment. Consequently, once a judgment is entered 
in Orr Z, regardless of who prevails all other claims, even claims against Uintah County 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Plaintiffs may have had arising out of the death of Detective Orr, merge into that 
judgment and are barred. 
Simply put, there is nothing left to litigate by Plaintiffs with respect to Uintah 
County and the death of Detective Orr. Since those claims do not or will not exist, there 
is nothing to be gained by a stay and no need to transfer venue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, Plaintiffs' Complaint in Orr II should be dismissed 
with prejudice. Simply put, the issue of Peter Martin Drilling, Inc., Rat Air, Inc. and 
Bryan Grayson's status as County employees and Uintah County's potential liability to 
Plaintiffs should these Defendants be found to be volunteers/employees was resolved or 
will be resolved in Orr I. 
DATED this 28th day of January ,2010. 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
^Jesse C. Trentadue 
UINTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
John H. Gothard, Jr. 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Uintah County, Utah 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Claudia Orr and Eugene Orr, individually, on j 
behalf of their deceased son, Kevin Orr, Holly 
Orr, individually and on behalf of the estate 
and heirs of Kevin Orr, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Uintah County, State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Case No. 090800834 
Judge A. LYNN PAYNE 
At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss (on March 16, 2010), the Court agreed to delay 
ruling on this matter until Judge Anderson ruled on an issue previously decided in Orr I; i.e. 
whether the Defendants in Orr I qualified as volunteers under the Volunteer Service Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-8-101. Based upon the pleadings in this matter concerning the Motion to 
Dismiss, the Court was under the impression that Uintah County had raised the issue of whether 
the Defendants qualified as volunteers in its motion to intervene in Orr I. The Court has 
reviewed the issues which Uintah County raised in its motion to intervene. Uintah County did 
not raise the issue of the Volunteer Service Act in its motion to intervene. Indeed, Uintah 
County's pleadings clearly state that they were not seeking to intervene on the basis of the 
Volunteer Service Act, Therefore, there is no pending issue for Judge Anderson to rule on. 
Furthermore, the Court cannot ask Judge Anderson to rule on an issue not raised in the motion to 
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intervene. Therefore, the Court will now rule on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Defendant offers a number of reasons why the case should be dismissed. The Court 
finds thai it is sufficient to dismiss this case based on Rule 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) defense is 
a claim that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Rule 
12(b)(6) defense is a challenge to the plaintiffs right to relief based on the facts the plaintiff has 
alleged in the complaint Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
Here, the Plaintiffs' first two claims ask the Court to enter an order declaring the 
Helicopter Defendants (Grayson, PMD and Rat Air) not immune under the Volunteer Worker's 
Act., and under the Volunteer Service Act, Grayson, PMD and Rat Air are not parties to this 
matter. Furthermore, Grayson, PMD, and Rat Air are defendants in Orr I which concerns the 
same facts as this case. Any claims or defenses against these defendants should have been raised 
in Orr I. Therefore, the Court cannot grant the Plaintiffs requested relief as to those two claims. 
The Plaintiffs' third claim states that if a court finds Grayson, PMD and Rat Air to be 
volunteers under the Volunteer Worker's Act, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages 
from Uintah County. The Plaintiffs do not indicate how they are entitled to recover their 
damages from Uintah County. The Plaintiffs do not allege that Uintah County, its agents or 
employees acted negligently or grossly negligent. 
Frankly, the Plaintiffs' reason for initiating this action is to create a fall back in the event 
that they are unsuccessful in Orr I. If the Plaintiffs wanted to bring a claim against Uintah 
County, a claim that arose from the same facts and circumstances as those in Orr I, they should 
have stated their claim in that case. As such, this case is merely a hollow case, kept open in the 
event the Plaintiffs do not succeed in Orr I. The claim is uncertain and fails to specify the cause 
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of action. The claim is contingent on the outcome of Orr I. Consequently, the Plaintiffs failed to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
Dated this MJ day of /<fmk^ 2010 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNE, District Court Judge 
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